Introduction
The genius of the American system of government ensures freedom of religion for those desiring to exercise their faith and freedom from religion for those with no interest. In the U.S., military commanders bear responsibility to ensure Service Members are provided the opportunity for free exercise of religion as mandated by the First Amendment. Until relatively recently, however, U.S. commanders could ignore religious matters external to the force structure with relative impunity. This is no longer the case, for at the operational level of war the subject of religion transcends merely providing for the needs of U.S. personnel.
Indeed, Unified Combatant Commanders are now faced with a pluralistic--often-volatile--world where religion is a significant force. Paul Wrigley writes: Although religion's role in the theater of operations is often underestimated and hard to quantify, the wise commander will attempt to identify its impact in his theater. The operational commander, who is ignorant of or discounts the importance of religious belief, can incite his enemy, offend his allies, alienate his own forces, and arouse public opinion. 1 The complexity of religion in military theaters and areas of responsibility (AORs) is underscored by conspicuous U.S. failures. It is widely acknowledged, for instance, that the 1979 revolution that toppled the Iranian government caught the U.S. unprepared largely because American elites could not imagine any country seriously embracing Islamic fundamentalism. The sobering recognition of Islam as an explosive force, however, did not prevent subsequent regrettable events as U.S. commanders dealt with Muslims. For example, in April 1991 U.S. forces dropped Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) with pork to starving Kurdish Muslims. 2 The Kurds were embittered by what they viewed as a cruel dilemma created by the U.S.--starvation or violation of their religious dietary laws. Ironically, MREs without pork could have been dropped with a minimal amount of additional effort. 3 In Somalia, religion was more than a question of public relations when Bengali Muslim troops hesitated to provide supporting fires for U.S. forces because they did not know if a "Fatwah" (Muslim legal ruling) had been issued authorizing them to kill fellow Muslims. 4 In light of increasing stakes, it is clear that effective commanders will take religion seriously while using the full range of tools available. For the Unified Commander, religious issues and implications will be worked in a variety of staff functions to include intelligence (J-2), information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP), and the Unified Command Chaplain. The Unified Command Chaplain is specifically tasked to serve the Unified Commander as the principal advisor on matters of religion. An important first step is to create a consistent set of standards to enable Unified
Commanders to know what they may expect (and as a result demand) from their Command
Chaplains. This in turn will also serve as a benchmark enabling chaplains to know what they must produce. The most effective way to start the professionalization process is to formalize the precepts of joint ministry and policy by directing a complete revision of Joint Pub 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations. At a minimum, the revised pub should: Command Chaplain can hope to convey the commander's intent on a plethora of religious and chaplain-related issues without effective intermediaries throughout the AOR. This reality makes JTF Chaplains key assets. Unfortunately, the role of the JTF Chaplain is a matter of wide speculation. Unlike tactical-level chaplain billets that are mastered in the progress of a career, JTF Chaplain positions are frequently filled by arbitrarily selected (and inadequately prepared) chaplains. Once tapped, the neophyte JTF Chaplain will find no rulebook for review, scarce training to be had, and very few post-JTF Chaplains to consult. 10 Though some learn on the job and become outstanding performers, their success is more a feature of personal talent than of a system designed to produce excellence.
The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Chaplain, for instance, notes that deficits in doctrine and training make JTF Chaplains the weak link in his AOR. 11 Formulation of standards for JTF Chaplains--many of whom will be truly functioning in a joint capacity for the first time--is a critical area that should be tasked to JFCOM as soon as possible. In addition to formulating required functions and tasks, there is a pressing need for JFCOM to 
Expectation Baselines for Unified Command Chaplains
As a baseline expectation, Unified Commanders should be able to look to the Unified Command Chaplain for a mastery of the religious issues in the AOR. Such a skill set must transcend the mere provision and facilitation of worship for U.S. personnel. At a minimum, this would also entail:
• The ability to analyze conflicts for religious content;
• The ability to advise the commanders on mitigation of religiously-charged scenarios; • Comprehensive knowledge of religion in the AOR before, if possible, the commencement of hostilities; and • The coordination and execution of religious engagement efforts.
The first of these baseline expectations is the ability to analyze regional conflicts for religious content. Unified Command Chaplains must be able to diagnostically assess which conflicts are patently religious, which conflicts are not religious, and which conflicts--though not primarily religious--have the potential to flash into a so-called "Holy War." In actuality, a close examination reveals that not as many conflicts are patently religious as one may think.
"More people have died in the name of God than for anything else," is a commonly heard phrase. Yet, instead of confirming the frequency of religious warfare, the statement reflects the human penchant to eulogize war dead in ultimate terms. The twentieth century was the bloodiest century in human history, and most victims did not die in religious conflicts. Yet, theological language became the coin of the bereaved in both large and small conflicts.
12 This tendency is mirrored by the leaders of nations in virtually every war. Thus, it is important to understand that despite the use of religious rhetoric, most conflicts are nonsectarian affairs.
In A second type of war is not religious in the least, despite the use of religious grammar. Northern Ireland, for instance, is a conflict rich in theological language but devoid of theological issues. 13 It would be a major mistake for any nation to view conflicts such as these as holy wars. Indeed, conflicts are seldom religious when the contested issue is primarily a matter of which ethnic groups will govern their neighbors. Unified Commanders should approach such cases as non-sectarian clashes of conflicting interests, with religious monikers masking a conspicuous lack of religious issues. Failure to understand this dynamic is analogous to watching a pro football game between Dallas and Washington and thinking real cowboys are battling real Indians. Fatwahs as an IO stroke of brilliance.
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The third baseline for Unified Command Chaplains must be a comprehensive knowledge of religion in the AOR before, if possible, the commencement of hostilities.
Unified Commanders are responsible for vast amounts of territory, frequently marked by religiously diverse populations. In a religiously pluralistic Unified Command (such as EUCOM with ninety-three nations), it is virtually impossible for any one officer to master the religious dynamics of the AOR without a connectional relationship to key resources.
Vital resources for monitoring religious issues by geographic region are found in the U.S. After considerable debate, the decision was made on the basis of military necessity to bomb Serbia on Orthodox Easter. The military utility of the decision to bomb Serbia on their holy day is one that will be judged by history. Unfortunately, the Serbs were able to note that the only other military to have bombed them on Easter was the Nazis during the Second World A second important distinction is to discern the difference between when a chaplain's duty is an honorable manifestation of religious ministry (that happens to have IO utility) and when the chaplain would be asked to undertake missions not rooted in the valid exercise of religious ministry support. The former scenario is acceptable while the latter is not. For instance, when U.S. Forces moved captured Taliban fighters to Camp X-ray at the U.S.
Naval Base in Cuba, a Muslim U.S. Navy chaplain was ordered to the camp. The chaplain conducted normal duties as a Muslim cleric including daily prayers over the camp speaker system and the story received widespread press coverage. No doubt the entire evolution was an IO (and public relations) coup. Yet, this is acceptable because the chaplain was merely asked to perform standard religious duties in a U.S. military camp. Were the chaplain to be asked to counsel prisoners and report to camp officials, however, it would be illegal, unethical and highly detrimental in the long run. Unified Command Chaplains must be exceedingly vigilant to protect the integrity of chaplain employment throughout the AOR.
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